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Abstract
Before presenting a detailed outline of the foreign investment laws and regulations of the
DPRK, this Essay surveys the institutional environment in which these laws and regulations func-
tion. This Essay concludes with some specific remarks on the rules that pertain to investments in
natural resources, including pledge law, and the possibility that foreign investors may be able to
negotiate rules governing their investments that would differ from those described in this Essay.
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INTRODUCTION
Although it was the United States that negotiated the first
treaty by a Western nation to open Korea in 1882,1 U.S. investors
who opened and developed the first modern gold mine in what
is now the Democratic People's Republic of Korea ("DPRK") in
1895,2 and U.S missionaries who first brought Christianity to Ko-
rea and whose successors trained Kim II Sung's father in English
and Presbyterian self-reliance at their mission school in that
same region of Korea, Americans and North Koreans have been
frozen in mutual isolation for over five decades with virtually no
opportunity to pursue relations of any kind, including commer-
cial and financial relations.
Since the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950,' the United
States has enforced a comprehensive set of legal and regulatory
restrictions on economic relations with the DPRK, including a
nearly total embargo on trade and investment activity.4 The
DPRK showed no apparent interest in engaging in broad inter-
national economic relations5 until after the dissolution of the
USSR in 1991, and the consequent loss of concessionary price
and payment terms for the trade it had carried on with the
USSR.6
* Partner, O'Melveny & Myers LLP.
** Partner, Patterson, Belknap, Webb & Tyler LLP.
Associate Director, Program on International Finance Systems, Harvard Law
School.
1. BRUCE CUMMINGS, KOREA's PLACE IN THE SUN: A MODERN HISTORY 99 (1997).
2. Id. at 125.
3. Id.
4. Congressional Research Service, Korea: Procedural and Jurisdictional Questions Re-
garding Possible Normalization of Relations with North Korea, 21-31 (1994).
5. See Id. at 21.
6. ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, EIU COUNTRY PROFILE: SOUTH KOREA, NORTH
KOREA: 1994-1995 76 (1995).
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Ironically, following a controversy over the DPRK's nuclear
capabilities and intentions in 1992-94, that nearly triggered the
outbreak of war,7 the long-standing icy relations between the
United States and the DPRK began to thaw. The resolution of
this confrontation over the DPRK's nuclear capabilities and in-
tentions was brought about by the intervention of former Presi-
dent Jimmy Carter and the negotiation and signing of the
Agreed Framework of October 21, 1994 between the two coun-
tries ("Agreed Framework"). 8 In that agreement, the DPRK
agreed to freeze and eventually dismantle its existing nuclear fa-
cilities in exchange for the construction of two light water reac-
tors and the interim supply of heavy oil to cover electric power
lost in the transition. In addition to other nuclear and energy
related provisions, the two sides agreed to move toward the full
normalization of political and economic relations, including the
reduction of barriers to trade and investment and the promotion
of peace on the Korean peninsula.9
The Agreed Framework has proven to be an effective vehi-
cle for reducing tensions, building mutual confidence, and dem-
onstrating the emergence of a more flexible and pragmatic
DPRK.' ° Much of its success grows out of the experience of the
Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization ("KEDO"),
a consortium originally including the United States, South Ko-
rea, and Japan (and now expanded to twelve members including
the EU), that was formed to take responsibility for arranging the
financing and construction of the two light water nuclear reac-
tors provided for in the Agreed Framework. Although none of
the original consortium members recognized the DPRK diplo-
matically, or had underlying investment or enforcement treaties
with it, a complex supply agreement together with six protocols
and numerous ancillary agreements, were successfully negoti-
ated. In August 1997, ground breaking for the first part of the
US$5 billion light water reactor construction project was held,
7. For a discussion of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea ("DPRK')
znuclear issue see LEON V. SEGAL, DISARMING STRANGERS: NUCLEAR DIPLOMACY WITH
NORTH KOREA (1998); DON OBERDORFER, THE Two KOREAS: A CONTEMPORARY HISTORY
(1997)
8. For the text of the Agreed Framework, see SEGAL, supra note 7, at 262-264.
9. Id.
10. Albright, Remarks at the ASEAN Regional Forum (july 27, 1997) (USIA Tran-
script).
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an event that clearly signaled the DPRK's willingness and ability
to live up to its commitments. In late March 1998, Paul Cleve-
land, the Chairman of KEDO's executive board and its U.S. rep-
resentative, confirmed that this adherence to contractual com-
mitments by the DPRK in furtherance of the KEDO project was
ongoing."
The success of the KEDO experience has encouraged other
efforts to overcome the legacy of war and hostile division on the
Korean peninsula. On June 25, 1997, forty-seven years to the day
the Korean War broke out, the four principal combatants, in-
cluding the United States, the Republic of Korea, the People's
Republic of China, and the DPRK, agreed to discuss bringing
closure to that conflict by negotiating the replacement of the
current armistice with a formal peace accord. 12 Since then, two
formal plenary sessions of the Four Party Talks have been held in
Geneva. 3 Following up on a proposal presented by the DPRK
delegation at the last session of the Four Party Talks in March
1998, for the first time since 1994, the DPRK and the Republic of
Korea agreed to hold bilateral talks on economic relations.
Additional evidence of a more open and pragmatic attitude
by the Pyongyang government is found in the following list of
recent actions:
" the issuance of an unprecedented apology for the submarine
intrusion incident,
* an open appeal for food aid to the international community
and its acceptance of food aid from the United States and
South Korea,
* an agreement to hold talks on missile proliferation,
* permission given to U.S. officials to search for remains of Ko-
rean War servicemen,
" permission for Japanese wives of Koreans to visit their families
in Japan, and
" an agreement with South Korea to establish a divided family
locating center.
Paralleling this shift of behavior in the political realm,
11. Peter Montagnon, Supplier Seeks N. Korean Cash, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 26, 1998.
12. North Korea Agrees to Peace Talks, ASSOCIxTED PRESS, June 25, 1997.
13. Alexander G. Higgens, North Korea, South Korea Open Peace Talks, ASSOCIATED
PRESS, Dec. 9, 1997; US Reports Progress in Korea Peace Talks, REUTERS, Mar. 18, 1998.
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North Korea has pursued a plan to attract foreign investors and
new trading relationships that might help it rebuild its stagnant
economy and raise its living standards without threatening its in-
dependence or distinctive social system. Following the collapse
of the Socialist Bloc in 1991, an effort was mobilized to prepare
the legal and physical infrastructure for an initial free trade zone
based on the Chinese model. The initial free trade zone was to
be established in the northeast corner of the country bordering
China and Russia. The Rajin-Sonbong Golden Triangle zone,
which opened for business in 1995, is targeted to attract transit
and export processing activity from neighboring countries, as
well as other investments attracted by seaport, railway, and river
transport facilities and convenient access to natural resource
supplies and markets in the hinterlands of the Tuman River
delta. To date, over US$250 million of mostly Swedish, Hong
Kong, and Japan resident Korean investment has been commit-
ted to the zone, and a foreign joint venture bank, managed by
ING Bank, has set up a branch there.
North Korea now appears to be prepared to accelerate its
economic opening program. During the visit of an official
DPRK investment and trade promotion delegation in January
1998, Kim Mun Sung, Chairman of the Korea Committee for the
Promotion of International Trade stated as follows:
My country today, has, in fact, no restrictions on the develop-
ment of economic and trade relations with the U.S. from a
legal point of view. Rather, favorable conditions for develop-
ment of economic and trade relations are being created by
the measures taken by the [DPRK] Government .... The
Government of the [DPRK] has set a forward looking objec-
tive to develop this [Rajin-Sonbong] zone into an integrated
area with international transit trade, transportation depot, ex-
port processing, tourism, and financial Service center func-
tions .. 14
Further indication of this policy shift was found by the au-
thors of this Essay, who met with government officials on a week-
long visit to the DPRK in early June 1997. Discussion at our
meetings focused on the prospects for investment by U.S. min-
ing companies in mines and mineral processing facilities located
14. Kim Mun Sung, DPRK-U.S. Economic Relations, Remarks at the Council on
Foreign Relations (Jan. 26, 1998).
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in a two-county area adjoining the Port of Danchon on the east
coast of the DPRK. This area, it was proposed, would be consti-
tuted as a new free trade zone, with investment opportunities to
be offered on a preferential basis to U.S. companies.
As a first step in assessing the feasibility of this proposal, the
authors undertook a review of the available legal infrastructure
and commercial and tax incentives for foreign investment in the
DPRK, paying special attention to the DPRK mining sector.
In evaluating the merits of any investment opportunity in
the DPRK, it is relevant to understand what motives may be driv-
ing the proposed preferential investment incentives being of-
fered to U.S. interests in particular. In the course of the diplo-
matic process leading up to the Four Party Talks, as well as in
recent discussions with American visitors, North Korean govern-
ment officials have made no secret of their commitment to pur-
suing a strategy intended to build a strong security and eco-
nomic alliance with the United States. Such an alliance, it is ex-
plained, would serve as a means of protecting North Korea from
military or economic takeover by their neighbors to the south
and as one cornerstone for building a new regional framework
for peace, security, and economic development in northeast
Asia. It has been suggested that trading a reduction of its threat-
ening military capacity in exchange for a U.S. security guarantee
and assistance to rebuild its economy may be seen as a good bar-
gain to help ensure survival of an independent DPRK. 15
Indeed, President Clinton may have been encouraging such
thinking by publicly imploring North Korea on April 25, 1997, to
enter peace talks in order to permit the United States and others
"not only to give emergency food aid - because people are terri-
bly hungry - but to work with them in restructuring their entire
economy and helping to make it more functional again ...."
Without a process of economic rehabilitation that narrows the
wide gap in living standards between the northern and southern
parts of the Korean peninsula, the prospects of a soft-landing
reconciliation and peaceful integration of this divided land may
15. Meetings with Kim Gye Gwan, Vice Minister ot Foreign Affairs of DPRK, and
Pak Myong Guk, Section Chief, Department of American Affairs, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of DPRK (June 3-10, 1997, in Pyongyang, DPRK).
16. N. Korean Jeopardizing Famine Aid, AssOCLAmD PREss, April 25, 1997 (quoting
President Bill Clinton).
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not be promising.17 While fulfilling ordinary business objectives,
U.S. investment might also contribute to the prospects of peace
and economic development in this region.
One threshold issue confronting any prospective U.S. inves-
tor in the DPRK is the existing regime of U.S. commercial sanc-
tions that currently prohibit any form of investment in the
DPRK.'8 While no concrete advance commitments have been
announced, it may be reasonable to assume that progress in the
Four Party Talks will lead to various normalization steps, includ-
ing diplomatic recognition and the progressive lifting of eco-
nomic sanctions. In view of the DPRK's priority interest in pro-
moting U.S. investment in its mining sector, it is not unlikely
that sanctions in this area will be lifted on an expedited basis.
Reports of widespread famine and predictions of the immi-
nent collapse of the DPRK raise additional questions for pro-
spective investors concerned with the long-term economic viabil-
ity of the country as an investment counterparty. While some
commentators predict the inevitable collapse and reunification
of the country with South Korea,' 9 others, such as Marcus No-
land in the July/August 1997 Foreign Affairs, argue that North
Korea has the economic and political staying power to at least
"muddle through" its current crisis without making any radical
reforms. 20 With a population conditioned by nearly two genera-
tions of tight discipline and inculcated with an ideology of he-
roic self-sacrifice and passionate resistance to threats to itsauton-
omy, a breakdown in social order may be highly unlikely without
much greater economic strain and a lifting of controls on) infor-
mation flows. 21 As Noland further argues, collapse and involun-
tary reunification would involve too much cost and risk for all
the parties concerned. On the other hand, "the reform option
offers potentially enormous payoffs."22
Before presenting a detailed outline of the foreign invest-
17. Robert A. Manning, Averting a Korean Meltdown: A Strategy for the Endgame.
(Progressive Policy Institute, Policy Report, 1997).
18. See supra note 4.
19. Nicholas Eberstat, Hastening Korean Unification, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Mar./Apr.
1997, at 77-92.
20. Marcus Noland, Why North Korea Will Muddle Through, FoREIGN AFFris, July/
Aug. 1997, at 105-18.
21. Id. at 110.
22. Id. at 111.
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ment laws and regulations of the DPRK, 21 this Essay surveys the
institutional environment in which these laws and regulations
function. This Essay concludes with some specific remarks on
the rules that pertain to investments in natural resources, includ-
ing pledge law, and the possibility that foreign investors may be
able to negotiate rules governing their investments that would
differ from those described in this Essay.
While the authors attempt in this piece to describe some
important legal developments in the DPRK and the opportuni-
ties they may present to foreign investors, some caveats are ap-
propriate at the outset:
* The authors have no formal education in DPRK law, nor are
they qualified to practice this law. Moreover, the formulation
that the DPRK's government policy has not always been trans-
parent to foreign observers, and law and legal policy are no
exception.
* The DPRK may issue legislation (including parliamentary en-
actments, presidential decrees, decisions of the government
and regulations of administrative authorities) that may be "se-
cret" in whole or in part. If experience in other socialist states
in transition is any guide, "secret" legislation may concern in-
dustrial and commercial assets that are historically linked to
the defense industry and may circumscribe the ability of man-
agement of such enterprises to deal with foreigners or to en-
cumber or transfer their assets.
" The law of the DPRK does not include clear rules stating the
hierarchy of legal authority and which legal authority must be
deemed to control in the event of a conflict. As a conse-
quence, investors may have to be aware of a broader spectrum
of legal sources and may need to anticipate and seek resolu-
tion of differences between sources of law. This situation may
be complicated if there is difficulty in discovering law on ad-
ministrative procedures that establishes when and how admin-
istrative organs can issue decisions and regulations and what
recourse exists to challenge them.
" The DPRK has a socialist legal system, and the foreign invest-
ment legislation described here must be generally understood
as a series of exceptions to that system. The socialist legal sys-
23. See infra Exhibit A.
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tem may have important ramifications or even direct applica-
tions for foreign investors. For instance, by analogy again to
other socialist legal systems, many routine matters, such as
making a loan, to an employee or charging interest on such
loan might be sanctionable under the criminal code. The
workers' collective and local Workers Party may have privileges
and prerogatives that will strike an entrepreneur as strange.
* The Workers Party enjoys a constitutional role in North Korea
as a protector of the rights and interests of the working class.
While we know very little about the North Korean court sys-
tem, the experience of other socialist countries suggests that
party officials may intervene in cases of interest to them and
dictate the outcome of such cases. Further, the scarcity of for-
eign investment in North Korea to date suggests that North
Korean courts have little experience interpreting or enforcing
financial agreements or foreign investment contracts. All of
these considerations may lead foreign investors to be circum-
spect about any agreement to accept dispute resolution in the
courts or arbitration bodies of North Korea.
I. GOVERNMENTAL STRUCTURE
A. Legislative Branch
1. The Supreme People's Assembly
Under the Socialist Constitution of the Democratic People's
Republic of Korea ("Constitution"), the Supreme People's As-
sembly ("SPA") is the highest organ of state power. 24 The depu-
ties of the SPA are elected every five years on the "principle of
universal, equal and direct suffrage by secret ballot."25 Under
the Constitution, the SPA has the authority to amend the Consti-
tution, adopt laws and ordinances, and establish the basic princi-
ples of the State's domestic and foreign policies. 26 Other powers
include the ability to deliberate and approve the State budget,
the power to decide on ratification and nullification of treaties
suggested to the SPA, and the responsibility of deciding ques-
tions of war and peace. 27 Additionally, the SPA purportedly has
24. See Socialist Constitution of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, art. 87
[hereinafter Constitution].
25. Id. art. 89.
26. See id. art. 91.
27. See id.
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the sweeping authority to elect or recall the President of the
DPRK as well as the Vice President, all the members of the Na-
tional Defence Commission, the members of the Central Peo-
ple's Committee, the members of the Standing Committee of
the SPA, the President of the Central Court, and all of the mem-
bers of the Administration Council.2" Thus, under the provi-
sions of the Constitution, all other branches are held accounta-
ble to the SPA, and the ultimate power is in the hands of the
people of the republic which the SPA represents. 29
2. The Standing Committee
The Standing Committee acts in place of the SPA taking
most of the responsibilities of the SPA when the SPA is not in
session.3 ° Considering that the SPA is in session once or twice a
year upon the direction of the Standing Committee,31 the Stand-
ing Committee may essentially be the legislative branch of the
government depending on how long each session of the SPA
lasts. The Standing Committee consists of the Chairman, Vice-
Chairmen, Secretary, and members, all of whom are elected by
the SPA for five year terms.3 2
B. Executive Branch
1. President
The President of the DPRK acts as the Head of State and
represents the DPRK.33 Technically, the SPA has the power to
elect the President every five years. 4 Under the Constitution,
the President heads the Central People's Committee as well as
when necessary the Administration Council.3 5 Additionally, the
President retains the power to promulgate the laws, ordinances,
and decrees of the various branches of government,36 as well as
his own power to issue edicts and grant special pardons.37 Con-
28. See id.
29. See id. art. 4.
30. See id. arts. 100-101.
31. See id. art. 92.
32. See id. art. 100.
33. See id. art. 105.
34. See id. art. 91.
35. See id. art. 107.
36. See id.
37. See id. arts. 107-108.
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stitutionally, the President is held accountable to the SPA. 8
2. Central People's Committee
The Central People's Committee ("CPC"), consisting of the
President, two vice presidents, the CPC secretary, and other un-
specified members, 9 acts as the highest leadership body of state
power in the DPRK.4 0 Among its duties and authority, the CPC
is responsible for formulating domestic and foreign policies, di-
recting the work of the Administration Council, directing the ju-
diciary, ensuring the enforcement of the Constitution and other
laws, appointing or removing the members of the Administra-
tion Council, establishing or changing administrative subdivi-
sions, and ratifying or abolishing treaties signed with foreign
countries.41 The CPC, like all of the other offices in govern-
ment, is held accountable to the SPA.42
3. Administration Council
The Administrative Council ("AC") is the highest adminis-
trative arm of the government and works under the guidance of
the President and the CPC. The Premier, Vice-Premiers, Chair-
men, Ministers, and other members, all with terms of five years,
make up the AC.43 The AC directs the work of Commissions,
Ministries and local committees, initiates plans for national eco-
nomic development, runs the general operations of government,
concludes treaties with foreign governments, and safeguards the
rights of the people.44
4. National Defence Commission
The National Defence Commission ("NDC") acts as the
highest military leadership body of the DPRK.45 The NDC con-
sists of the Chairman, First Vice-Chairman, Vice-Chairmen, and
other Members.46 This commission has the power to direct and
38. See id. art. 109.
39. See id. art. 119.
40. See id. art. 117.
41. See id. art. 120.
42. See id. art. 123.
43. See id. art. 125.
44. See id. art. 136.
45. See id. art. 111.
46. See id. art. 112.
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command the armed forces, as well as to proclaim a state of war
and mobilization order in case of emergencies.4 v The NDC also
has the power to issue decisions and orders,4 presumably deal-
ing with matters of national security, though it is not specified.
5. Agencies That Regulate Foreign Trade and Investment
a. External Economic Authority of the Administration Council
The External Economic Authority of the Administration
Council ("EEA") is the main body that regulates foreign trade
on the national level. All businesses with foreign interests and a
requisite amount of investment must be approved by the EEA in
order to operate within the DPRK 49 In addition to having the
final say in determining the various forms of foreign enterprises
allowed to operate in the DPRK, the EEA exercises authority
over a broad range of matters such as approving the establish-
ment of branch and representative offices,5 ° reviewing applica-
tions for foreign workers to fill skilled and management posi-
tions,51 and supervising the making and performance of external
economic contracts.52
Administratively, the EEA is split into two bureaus. The Ex-
ternal Economic Cooperation Bureau supervises the operations
within the Free Economic Trade Zone ("FETZ"), 5 while the
Joint Venture Bureau handles all of the matters outside of the
47. See id. art. 114.
48. See id. art. 115.
49. All foreign invested enterprises with investments in infrastructure projects over
10 million Won and other investments over 20 million Won must be approved by the
EEA. See, e.g., Implementing Regulations on Contractual Joint Ventures, art. 21 [here-
inafter CJV Regulations]. All other foreign invested enterprises with investments under
these amounts must apply to the authority in the Free Economic Trade Zone ("ZA") for
approval. See id.
50. See Law of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on Foreign Enterprises,
art. 10 [hereinafter Foreign Enterprises Law]; Regulations on Resident Representative
Offices of Foreign Business in the Free Economic and Trade Zone, art. 10 [hereinafter
Representative Offices Law].
51. See Labour Regulations for Foreign-Invested Businesses, art. 4 [hereinafter La-
bour Regulations].
52. See Law of the DPRK on the External Economic Contract, art. 6 [hereinafter
External Economic Contract Law].
53. The FETZ is located in the northeast corner of the DPRK (Ranjin-Sonbong).
Additionally, the DPRK is planning additional zones near Sinuiju, Nampo and Wonsan.
See BRENDON A. CARR, ENDING THE HERMIT KINGDOM'S BELLIGERENT MENDICANCY: NEW
OPENNESS, NEW FOREIGN DIREcr INVESTMENT LAWS OF THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUB-
LIC OF KOREA 10 n.72 (1997).
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FETZ.54 Further, within these two bureaus are the Committee
for the Promotion of External Economic Cooperation
("CPEEC") and the Joint Venture Group, respectively.55 Both of
these subdivisions are state enterprises established to promote
foreign investments in the FETZ and other areas of the DPRK.5 6
b. Committee for the Promotion of External Economic
Cooperation
One researcher has used this name in place of the EEA and
essentially uses the office of the Committee for the Promotion of
External Economic Cooperation ("CPEEC") to describe the role
of the central government in the area of foreign trade and in-
vestment.57 This appears to be incorrect. Meetings with high
ranking officials revealed that the CPEEC is actually a subdivi-
sion of the EEA set up to promote foreign investments within
the FETZ.5 s
c. Free Economic Trade Zone Authority
According to the Law on the FETZ ("FETZ Law") the Free
Economic Trade Zone Authority ("Zone Authority") is the local
executive organ of the FETZ.59 Because the FETZ has been spe-
cially established by the State under the FETZ Law, the Zone
Authority essentially operates as the local Administrative and
Economic Committee of the province.6 ° The FETZ Law holds
that the State directs the operation of the FETZ through both
the EEA and the Zone Authority.6 1 Because the laws and regula-
tions dealing with foreign investments and trade distinguish the
separate roles of the EEA and the Zone Authority, the Zone Au-
54. See Meetings with Mr. Ho Dae Hyun, Department Director of the Mining In-
dustry, Mr. An Gee Un, Director of the External Economic Commission, and Mr.
Chong Chol Gwan, Chief of Division for Law Regulatory Office (June 4-6, 1997, Pyong-
yang, D.P.R.K.) [hereinafter Meetings].
55. See id.
56. See id.
57. See Timothy J. Min, II, North Korean Foreign Investment Laws: Foundation
for Foreign Economic Relations 22 (1996) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the
Fordham International Law Journal).
58. See Meetings, supra note 54.
59. See Law of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on Free Economic and
Trade Zone, art. 8 [hereinafter FETZ Law].
60. See id. arts. 2-3.
61. See id. art. 3.
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thority is presumably under the direct authority of the AC rather
than the EEA, but this is not entirely clear.
Along with the EEA, the Zone Authority exercises the main
authority over foreign trade and investments within the FETZ.
Specifically, the Zone Authority's mandate is to "organize and
implement the development and economic administrative and
operational activities" in the FETZ.62 The duties of the Zone Au-
thority include carrying out administrative and economic activi-
ties, maintaining order and protecting people and property, re-
viewing applications for foreign investments not reviewed by the
EEA, registering enterprises and issuing business licenses, em-
ploying workers in enterprises, leasing land and buildings, ren-
dering construction services for buildings, and conducting activi-
ties that generally promote investment and improvements in the
FETZ.63 In addition, the Zone Authority is cited in other laws
and regulations granting the Zone Authority discretion over a
broad range of matters in foreign investment and trade such as
establishing a technical training fund and center within the
FETZ,6 4 regulating and approving advertisements within the
FETZ,65 and supervising the registration of agents for foreign in-
vested enterprises.66 The random and varied nature of the as-
signments of both the EEA and the Zone Authority do not seem
to provide any apparent order or rationale for determining
which matters are governed by the EEA and which are under the
Zone Authority.
d. Provincial and Local Authorities
The Constitution establishes the People's Assembly and the
Administrative and Economic Committee ("AEC") of each prov-
ince and city as the local analogues, respectively, to the SPA and
the AC.6 7 With regard to governing aspects of foreign invest-
ments and trades, the regulations that address the naming and
registration of foreign invested enterprises provide that AEC's
62. Id. art. 11.
63. See id. art. 12.
64. See FETZ Law, supra note 59, art. 15.
65. See Regulations on Advertisement in the Free Economic and Trade Zone, art. 4
[hereinafter Regulations on Advertisement].
66. See Regulations on Agent for Foreign Investor in the Free Economic and Trade
Zone, art. 11 [hereinafter Regulations on Agent].
67. See Constitution, supra note 24, §§ 6-7.
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will handle these matters.68 But, outside of these duties and the
many special duties granted to the Zone Authority in the FETZ,
the laws and regulations are generally silent on the role of local
authorities in supervising foreign investment matters.
C. Judicial Branch
Three levels exist in the North Korean court system.69 The
People's Courts make up the lowest level, the Court of the prov-
ince or municipality act as the intermediate level courts as well as
the courts of first instance for special cities directly under central
control, and the Central Court, consisting of two associate chief
judges, stands as the highest court of appeal.7" Under the Con-
stitution, the functions of the Court are to protect the State
power and the socialist system, ensure that all abide strictly by
State laws, give judgments and findings with regard to property,
and conduct notarial work.7 1 The Court purportedly operates
independently in administering justice.7 2 Yet at the same time,
the Central Court is "guided" by the CPC, the main executive
body.7" Thus, the actual independence of the courts, even
under the Constitution, is questionable.
The laws and regulations on foreign investments often refer
to the court system of the DPRK as a secondary option if consul-
tation between the disputing parties does not work out. Unfor-
tunately, these laws and regulations do not provide any further
elaboration on the workings of the court system or even which
court would have original jurisdiction over a dispute arising
from foreign investment claims. Cases from the FETZ would
most likely be heard by a provincial or municipal court because
the FETZ is an area under the direct control of the central gov-
ernment, but the status of cases arising outside of the FETZ re-
mains uncertain.
68. See Regulations on Naming of Foreign-Invested Enterprises, art. 3 [hereinafter
Regulations on Naming]; Regulations on the Registration of Foreign-Invested Enter-
prises, art. 3 [hereinafter Regulations on Registration].
69. See Constitution, art. 152.
70. See North Korea, The Judiciary (visited April 23, 1998) <http://lcweb2.loc.gov/
cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cs:@field (docid-k0102) >.
71. See Constitution, supra note 24, art. 155.
72. See id. art. 159.
73. See id. art. 160.
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D. Arbitration
Because so little is known about the court system in the
DPRK, alternative dispute resolution options become essential
considerations for all potential foreign investors. Many of the
laws and regulations dealing with the various aspects of foreign
trade allude to the option of arbitration within the DPRK as an
alternative to the court system of the DPRK.7 4 None of these
laws or regulations, however, provide any insight into how the
arbitration system within the DPRK actually functions. Also,
there is no mention of an arbitration system or agency in the
Constitution, and so, even less is known about arbitration in the
DPRK than the court system.
Therefore, access to international arbitral bodies may be
the only safe option for foreigners in North Korea, but even this
option holds a few uncertainties. The largest problem with this
alternative is that not all of the relevant foreign investment laws
and regulations provide the option of taking a claim to interna-
tional arbitration. Within the collection of laws and regulations
dealing with foreign investments, only the Foreign Investment
Law,7 5 the Laws on Equity Joint Ventures76 ("EJV"), the Law on
External Economic Contract,77 the Regulations on Processing
Trade in the FETZ,78 the Regulations on Contract Construction
in the FETZ,79 and the Regulations on Tourism in the FETZ80
mention international arbitration as an option for dispute reso-
lution. Thus, it is an open question whether claims arising from
the rest of the laws and regulations that do not state third party
arbitration as an option, including those governing CJVs, wholly
foreign-owned enterprises, labor issues, and tax issues, may only
be heard in DPRK courts and arbitration agencies.
74. See, e.g., Law of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on Foreign Invest-
ment, art. 22 [hereinafter Foreign Investment Law]; Foreign Enterprises Law, art. 31;
Law of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on ContractualJoint Venture, art. 21
[hereinafter CJV Law]; Law of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on Equity
Joint Venture, art. 47 [hereinafter EJV Law].
75. See Foreign Investment Law, supra note 74, art. 22.
76. See EJV Law, supra note 74, art. 47.
77. See External Economic Contract Law, supra note 52, art. 42.
78. See Regulations on Processing Trade in the Free Economic and Trade Zone,
art. 43 [hereinafter Regulations on Processing Trade].
79. See Regulations on Contract Construction in the Free Economic and Trade
Zone, art. 63.
80. See Regulations on Tourism in the Free Economic and Trade Zone, art. 35.
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Another major concern with third party arbitration is the
uncertainty over whether the DPRK will even honor a ruling by a
tribunal outside of the DPRK. Officials have given assurances
that North Korea will indeed honor all decisions properly heard
and decided by third parties as a policy matter.81 Laws and regu-
lations providing for international arbitration as an alternative to
the North Korean courts and arbitration system lends support to
these reassurances. But, the DPRK has not officially signed on to
the New York Convention8 2 or any other international conven-
tions recognizing and enforcing arbitral awards, so this concern
is not fully dissipated."
E. Worker's Party
Running parallel to the entire structure of the formal gov-
ernment is the Worker's Party. In the only passage mentioning
the Worker's Party, Article 11 of the Constitution states that the
DPRK "shall conduct all activities under the leadership of the
Worker's Party of Korea." This Constitutional provision under-
scores the need for further information concerning both the for-
mal and informal role of the Worker's Party in legal and policy
matters, including those related to foreign investment.
II. DPRKJURISPRUDENCE
A. Presidential Edicts
The President, under the provisions of the Constitution, has
the power to issue edicts that carry is another point of conten-
tion. One source indicates that edicts made by the President su-
persede all other legislation (whether this would include the
Constitution is unclear).4 Contrary to this report, officials in
North Korea have stated that edicts issued by the President su-
persede neither the Constitution nor legislative acts.8 5 Under
the Constitution, the President is held accountable to the SPA.8 6
81. See Meetings, supra note 54.
82. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards,
21 U.S.T. 2517 (June 10, 1958).
83. Officials have suggested that they are willing to look into the possibility of sign-
ing onto an international convention recognizing arbitral awards. See id.
84. See North Korea, The Executive Branch: The President and Vice Presidents (visited
April 23, 1998) <http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cs:@field(docid-k0105)>.
85. See Meetings, supra note 54.
86. See Constitution, art. supra note 24, 109.
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So, in theory, a presidential edict should not supersede enacted
legislation. But the relationship among the Constitution, legisla-
tion and legislative acts of a body other than the SPA, and Presi-
dential edicts remains unclear. Additionally, the questions of
whether presidential edicts can trump administrative acts, provi-
sions of bilateral treaties, or judgments of North Korean courts
need further exploration.
B. Edicts by the Central People's Committee
In carrying out its executive functions, the CPC is also em-
powered to issue decrees, decisions, and directives."7 The CPC is
explicitly held accountable to the SPA for its acts, 8 so it does not
seem likely that any of its decrees would supersede legislation
enacted by the SPA. Similar to the status of presidential edicts,
however, the relationship between decrees issued by the CPC
and non-SPA legislation, acts of other governmental bodies, and
court decisions remains unclear.
C. Legislation Enacted by the Supreme People's Assembly
As the main legislative body of the DPRK, the SPA has the
power to enact legislation when more than half of the deputies
attending the session vote to approve the law.8" The SPA can
also amend the Constitution if more than two thirds of the total
number deputies vote to approve the amendment.9 ° Because all
other branches and offices of government are ultimately held
accountable to the SPA, acts by the SPA most likely supersede all
other governmental acts and decrees. Whether a DPRK court
could declare SPA legislation unconstitutional, however, is not
clear.
D. Administrative Law
Many laws and regulations that involve administrative bod-
ies provide procedures for appealing acts and decisions made by
these administrative bodies.91 In most cases, the laws and regula-
87. See id. art. 121.
88. See id. art. 123.
89. See id. art. 97.
90. See id.
91. See, e.g., Law of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on Foreign Invest-
ment-Business Enterprise and Individual Tax, art. 56 [hereinafter Foreign Investment-
Business Enterprise and Individual Tax Law]; Labour Regulations, art. 47; Customs Law
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tions allow the aggrieved party to petition the office immediately
superior to the department or official that made the original de-
termination.92 The superior office, in turn, will promptly issue a
decision within a certain time period (usually 30 days)." If the
party is not satisfied with this decision, then party has a time
limit (usually 10 days) in which to file a lawsuit with the appro-
priate court or arbitral body.9 4
E. International Law
The status of international law within North Korean juris-
prudence is uncertain. First, while all sources indicate that the
DPRK holds that international agreements to which it is a party
constitute a source of international law, the attitude of the DPRK
toward customary international law is unclear. Officials have
stated that the DPRK respects customary international law and
views international law as binding between states. 5 However,
other sources indicate that the DPRK rejects the concept of cus-
tomary international law. Second, the conditions under which
the DPRK gives effect in its domestic legal system to interna-
tional law is not free from doubt. Specifically, it is not clear
whether specific legislation is required for international law,
whether conventional or customary, to be recognized as valid
within the DPRK. For example, the tax laws relating to foreign-
invested enterprises provide that tax treaties between the DPRK
and another government take precedence over a contrary stat-
ute.'. Does this provision of DPRK indicate that, in the absence
of such a provision, tax treaties would not be considered DPRK
law or does it simply evaluate DPRK law with respect to treaties,
namely, that they supercede inconsistent legislation?
III. REGULATION OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT
A. Permitted Forms of Foreign Investment
The laws and regulations pertaining to foreign investment
of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, art. 50 [hereinafter Customs Law]; Reg-
ulations on Advertisement, art. 19.
92. See, e.g., Foreign Enterprise and Individual Tax Law, supra note 91, art. 56.
93. See id. art. 57.
94. See id.
95. See Meetings, supra note 54.
96. See Foreign Investment-Business Enterprise and Individual Tax Law, supra note
91, art. 7.
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in the DPRK recognize four forms in which a foreigner may in-
vest in the DPRK. Three forms include the principal characteris-
tics of contractual joint ventures, equity joint ventures, and
wholly-owned foreign enterprises. 97 In addition to these forms
of investment, foreigners may simply contract with DPRK firms
for the processing of raw materials or the assembly of compo-
nents into a finished good.
1. Representative Office
According to the Regulations on Resident Representative
Offices of Foreign Business in the Free Economic and Trade
Zone ("Regulations on Representative Offices"), foreign enter-
prises are allowed to open representative offices in the FETZ.98
Representative offices outside of the FETZ are not addressed in
any laws or regulations. Consequently, whether representative
offices are permitted outside the FETZ is an open question.
Regulations require a foreign business to obtain approval
from the EEA before opening a representative office in the
FETZ.99 All representative offices must file an application detail-
ing the business of the foreign enterprise, as well as a financial
statement of the recent period, a profit-and-loss account, and
the memorandum and list of the members of the board of direc-
tors of the parent enterprise. 00
In addition to the application, the regulations impose other
specific requirements for representative offices. First, the regu-
lations specify that the maximum term of residence for offices is
three years and that the number of representative officers can-
not exceed five.10 1 Offices that desire to stay in the zone any
longer than three years are required to submit a renewal applica-
tion to the original screening body three months before the
term of residence expires. 10 2 Also, the regulations specifically
forbid representative offices from certain activities such as im-
porting goods from foreign countries for the purpose of third-
country trade or consignment sale and exporting goods ob-
97. See Exhibit B for a chart reflecting these three forms of foreign investment in
the DPRK.
98. See Representatives Offices Law, art. 3.
99. See id. art. 10.
100. See id.
101. See id. art. 4.
102. See id. art. 22.
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tamined in the DPRK that are not authorized to the parent busi-
ness.1"' Service-related activities, on the other hand, such as liai-
son, consultation and dissemination of economic and technical
information related to the transactions of the parent business,
entering into contracts with clients, and making payments and
deliveries of goods, are suggested as proper activities in which
representative offices may engage.1"4 Finally, the regulations re-
quire representative offices to submit an annial report to the
screening body every January) 0 5
2. Wholly Foreign-Owned Enterprise
Enterprises that are wholly-owned by foreign investors are
allowed in the DPRK, but only in the FETZ.' 016 All wholly-foreign
owned enterprises are required to submit an application to the
Zone Authority before conducting business in the DPRK. °7
Along with an application for operation, an investor is required
to submit a memorandum of articles of association, a feasibility
study report, documents of the investor, a list of equipment and
materials to be contributed, manuals on industrial property
rights and technical know-how to be supplied, certificates on the
financial position of the investor, and other necessary docu-
ments." 8
Depending on the amount of investment in the enterprise,
either the EEA or the Zone Authority will consult the relevant
administrative agencies and screen the application materials for
approval.' 09 The screening body is required to give notice of ap-
proval or rejection of the project within ninety days from the
receipt of the application. 1 0
103. See id. art. 6.
104. See id. art. 5.
105. See id. art. 21.
106. See Regulations for the Implementation of the D.P.R.K. on Wholly Foreign-
owned Enterprises, art. 2 [hereinafter Regulations for WFOE]; Meetings, supra note 54.
107. See Regulations for WFOE, supra note 106, art. 12.
108. See id.
109. Infrastructure projects over 10 million Won and other projects over 20 mil-
lion Won are screened by the EEA. All other wholly foreign-owned projects under
these amounts are screened by the Zone Authority. See id. art. 18.
110. See id. art. 20.
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3. Forming Contractual Joint Ventures and Equity
Joint Ventures
Both CJVs and EJVs involve joint efforts between foreign
and North Korean parties. Foreign investors searching for a
North Korean counterpart must first decide whether they will
invest inside or outside of the FETZ.111 Depending on the de-
sired location of the enterprise, foreign investors will then go to
either the CPEEC or the Joint Venture Group which will help
them find a partner. 1 2
Foreign investors may contract with state-owned and collec-
tively-owned enterprises to form a joint venture.11 3 Separate
state organs such as various ministries and commissions receive
funds from the central government with which to establish enter-
prises. 114 Foreign investors can form joint ventures with state-
owned enterprises, which are separate legal entities operated by
the state organs.115 Each organ draws funds separately from the
central government, and each is permitted to operate indepen-
dently to produce a profit through the ventures. 1 6 Collectively-
owned enterprises are entities owned by individuals in the
DPRK. Most collectively-owned enterprises are found in agricul-
tural areas.11 7 Questions such as the power of a state-owned en-
terprise or collectively-owned enterprise to contract, incur debt,
and dispose of assets without ministerial approval remain to be
explored.
The actual process by which a partner is formed remains
unclear, particularly whether a foreign investor has the right to
select among several candidates or whether the partner is se-
lected by the state. Once found, however, the parties will meet
in informal consultations along with the EEA and submit a feasi-
bility report to the screening body.1 ' Then the parties will con-
clude a contract and submit it, along with all of the other neces-
sary documents, to the screening body for final approval of the
venture.
111. See Meetings, supra note 54.
112. See id.
113. See id.
114. See id.
115. See id.
116. See id.
117. See id.
118. See id.
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4. Contractual Joint Venture
The DPRK prefers CJVs for basic manufacturing, tourism,
and service sectors." 9 A CJV is an agreement between a foreign
investor and a DPRK partner where the DPRK partner is ex-
pected to take responsibility for production and management
while the foreigner furnishes the advanced machinery and tech-
nical processes and finds markets to sell the finished products.1 20
For a CJV to be approved, the regulations require that a CJV
either 1) uses advanced technology, 2) updates its equipment to
improve the quality of products to the international standard, 3)
produces internationally-competitive export goods, economizes
fuel, raw materials, materials, and power, or 4) makes an effec-
tive use of the already existing production capacity. 121
One key distinction between a CJV and an EJV is that the
liability of loss in a CJV is placed on the partner that does not
fulfill its responsibilities. 22 But, a similar feature between CJV
and an EJV is that both may be established anywhere in the
DPRK where a local partner can be found.
CJV investors are expected to draft a joint venture contract
and the necessary documents for submission to the relevant
screening body. 23 CJV parties are required to submit with its
application a joint venture contract, a memorandum of associa-
tion, a feasibility study report, and credit information issued by
the' bank with which the parties to the joint venture keep ac-
counts. 124 Upon receipt of the application, the relevant screen-
ing body125 will consult the planning body, the financial body,
the science and technology administration body, the construc-
tion supervision body, the land administration body, and the en-
vironmental protection body.1 26 The screening body will re-
spond with a decision within fifty days.' 27
119. See CJV Law, supra note 74, art. 3.
120. See id. arts. 2, 4.
121. See Implementing Regulations for the Law on Contractual Joint Venture, art.
16 [hereinafter Regulations on CJV].
122. See CJV Law, supra note 74, art. 19.
123. See Regulations on CJV, supra note 121, art. 17.
124. See id. art. 22.
125. The screening process is divided in the same manner as the wholly foreign-
owned enterprises. See id. art. 21; supra note 92.
126. See Regulations on CJV, supra note 121, art. 24.
127. See id. art. 26.
REGULATIONS OF KOREA
5. Equity Joint Venture
The DPRK prefers EJVs for high-tech and infrastructure
projects.1 28 Parties to an EJV will jointly contribute the invest-
ment and materials necessary for the venture, and a ninety per-
cent foreign majority ownership and control is allowed. EJVs are
juridical persons under the law, taking the form of limited liabil-
ity companies with each party's liability limited to the amount of
its subscription. 129 And, as noted above, EJVs are allowed to op-
erate anywhere in the DPRK. EJVs have several advantages over
the CJVs because of limited liability and the availability of inter-
national arbitration. 13 0
Upon drafting a contract between the parties, EJV parties
must provide the same documentation as CJV parties and the
relevant screening bodies will run through the same steps of re-
view as the CJV review process.13 1
B. Scope of Permitted Investments
1. Prohibited Investments
It is not surprising that the State has made certain sectors
such as publishing, press, telecommunications, and broadcasting
off-limits to foreign investment. 13 2 Additionally, Article 11 of the
Foreign Investment Law reserves a broad right of the State to
prohibit or restrict projects that hinder the development of the
national economy and threaten national security, or that are
technically obsolete and harmful to the environment. This lan-
guage has been adopted, with some modifications, in each of the
regulations concerning foreign-invested enterprises.1 33 It re-
mains unclear as to how the relevant authorities could interpret
this potentially broad prohibition.
2. Permitted Investments
Generally, Article 6 of the Foreign Investment Law allows
128. See EJV Law, supra note 74, art. 3.
129. See id. art. 4.
130. See id. art. 47; supra note 60.
131. See Implementing Regulations for the Law on EquityJoint Venture, arts. 13-23
[hereinafter Regulations on EJV].
132. See Regulations for WFOE, supra note 106, art. 10; Meetings, supra note 54
(indicating that these sectors are off-limits to EJVs and CJVs as well).
133. See Regulations for WFOE, supra note 106, art. 9; Regulations on EJV, supra
note 74, arts. 11-12; Regulations on CJV, art. 7.
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foreign interests to invest in sectors such as industry, agriculture,
construction, transport, telecommunications, science and tech-
nology, tourism, commerce, and financial sectors. The regula-
tions dealing with the three major forms of foreign investments
have essentially adopted this general list of permitted invest-
ments, further detailing the specific areas of investment permit-
ted for each venture. 134 Also, officials have indicated that these
lists of permitted investments are not exhaustive and that any
activity not explicitly prohibited or permitted under the laws and
regulations would be open for negotiation between the potential
investors and the State.1 35
3. Encouraged Investments
Article 7 of the Foreign Investment Law particularly encour-
ages investments in sectors requiring high and modern technol-
ogy, sectors that produce internationally competitive goods, sec-
tors in natural resource development and infrastructure con-
struction, and sectors in scientific research and technology
development. 136 Mining falls within the scope of Article 7 under
the "natural resource development" category.13 7 The State en-
courages these particular investment sectors by providing reduc-
tions and exemptions from income and other taxes, favorable
conditions for land use, and the preferential supply of bank
loans.1 3
8
C. Conditions Upon Establishment
1. Regulatory
Because the intent of the new laws is to encourage foreign
investment in the DPRK, the laws do not place many impedi-
ments in the way of establishing an enterprise in the DPRK. The
laws and regulations do not impose requirements in areas such
as the types of technology contributed, the amount of capital
that a foreign party must contribute to an enterprise, or the
number of jobs that an enterprise must create for the DPRK.
134. See Regulations for WFOE, supra note 106, art. 7; Regulations on EJV, supra
note 74, art. 8; Regulations on CJV, art. 4.
135. See Meetings, supra note 54.
136. See also Regulations on EJV, supra note 74, art. 9; Regulations on CJV, supra
note 106, art. 5.
137. See Meetings, supra note 54.
138. See Foreign Investment Law, supra note 74, art. 8.
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But, concerning wholly foreign-owned enterprises, EJVs, and
CJVs, the regulations do reserve a general right of the State to
require that enterprises be equipped with hi-tech and modern
technologies and production facilities, be able to produce inter-
nationally competitive goods, or be able to raise the quality of its
products up to international standards."3 9
One requirement that is imposed both on EJVs and on
wholly foreign-owned enterprises is a minimum ratio of regis-
tered capital to the total investment. Although no minimum
amount of capital is required, these enterprises must maintain a
minimum percentage of registered capital to the total invest-
ment.140
Additionally, the regulations allow contributions from inves-
tors to be made in the form of cash, property in kind, technical
know-how, industrial property, and the like.1 41 But, only twenty
percent of the investment may be made in the form of industrial
property rights, copyrights, or technical know-how. 142
2. Taxes and Fees
The laws and regulations do not require any special taxes or
fees for approval of an enterprise.
D. Controls on the Operation of Foreign Investment
1. Performance Requirements
No specific section regulates such factors as the minimum
amount of earnings required from an enterprise, the number of
jobs created by a project, or the amount of investments required
as conditions for continuing operation of permitted investments.
2. Controls on Capital
The DPRK imposes its controls on capital mainly through its
139. See Regulations for WFOE, supra note 106, art. 8; see also Regulations on, EJV,
supra note 74, art. 12; Regulations on CJV, supra note 123, art. 7.
140. Both the Regulations on EJV and the Regulations for WFOE require a scaled
percentage of the total investment to be registered capital (depending on the amount
of the total investment). See Regulations for WFOE, supra note 106, art. 26; Regulations
on EJV, supra note 74, art. 46.
141. See Regulations for WFOE, supra note 106, art. 28; Regulations on EJV, supra
note 74, art. 31; Regulations on CJV, art. 37.
142. See Regulations for WFOE, supra note 106, art. 29; Regulations on EJV, supra
note 74, art. 39. However, the Regulations on CJV do not impose this requirement.
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laws and regulations concerning foreign exchange control. The
Law on Foreign Exchange Control specifically forbids the circu-
lation of foreign currency within the territory of the DPRK, hold-
ing that foreign currency must be converted into Korean Won if
it is to be used.14 3 Exchange transactions may only be done by
the Foreign Trade Bank or another bank authorized by the State
to engage in foreign exchange transactions. 144 The exchange
rate for the Korean Won is determined by the Foreign Exchange
Administration Organization 145 ("FEAO"), which also has the au-
thority to supervise the use of foreign exchange in the DPRK.' 4 6
Regarding the import of foreign currencies, the State allows
an unlimited amount of foreign currencies, securities denomi-
nated in foreign currency, and precious metals to be brought in
to the DPRK. The DPRK does, on the other hand, place some
restrictions on the export of foreign currencies. Foreign curren-
cies and precious metals may not be taken out of the country in
amounts exceeding the amounts declared to the Customs Office
when first brought into the country. 1 47 The laws carve out an
exception to this rule for those individuals and enterprises oper-
ating within the FETZ by allowing foreign currencies or securi-
ties to be removed without reference to the related documents
or customs declarations.148
Concerning the remittance of profits earned within the
DPRK, the laws allow a foreign investor to remit abroad limitless
profits earned in the investor's business activities."' A foreign
individual working for a foreign-invested enterprise, however,
may only remit up to sixty percent of the total salary earnings.
3. Price Controls
Because businesses within the DPRK are required to sell to
the government, which then distributes the products to the peo-
ple, and because foreign enterprises are required to purchase
raw materials it purchases in the country from the government,
143. See Law of the Democratic People's Republic Korea on Foreign Exchange
Control, art. 6 [hereinafter Foreign Exchange Control Law].
144. See id. art. 5.
145. See id. art. 7.
146. See id. art. 21.
147. See id. arts. 23, 26.
148. See id. art. 25.
149. See id. art. 27.
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businesses have no choice but to negotiate with one party to de-
termine domestic price.1 50 In these cases, it is not stated
whether the domestic price is set by the international market
rate or by the negotiations between the parties and the DPRK.
Outside of these indirect controls on pricing, the laws and regu-
lations do not attempt to control how enterprises set their prices
and, presumably, judgments as to pricing of both imports and
exports would be left to the enterprise.
4. Controls on Competition
Officials have affirmatively indicated that the State would be
willing to negotiate with parties in granting a monopoly or an
oligopoly as part of the establishment agreement of the enter-
prise.1 51 These agreements are concluded on a case-by-case ba-
sis, along with most of the other conditions for establishing a
venture. 1 2 No law or regulation officially allows or prohibits the
granting of monopolies and oligopolies.
5. Controls on Employment Practices
Not surprisingly, laws regulating labor and employment are
restrictive. The Labour Regulations for Foreign Invested Busi-
nesses (the "Labour Regulations") require all enterprises to hire
North Korean workers, with an exception that management and
unavailable skilled positions may be staffed by foreigners with
the approval of the EEA.1"3 And because the labor unions and
the labor service agencies act as extensions of the State, the
DPRK exercises considerable control in this area of the business.
Extensive guidelines are imposed on the procedure for dis-
missing a worker. First, a business must obtain the consent of
the labor union and the labor service agency before it is able to
dismiss an employee. In addition, the Labour Regulations lists
the exclusive reasons why an employer may dismiss an employee:
1) the worker is incapacitated from a non-work related cause, 2)
the amount of workers must be reduced due to changes in the
technical or production condition, 3) the enterprise is filing for
bankruptcy or is winding up its business, or 4) an employee in-
150. See Foreign Enterprises Law, art. 17.
151. See Meetings, supra note 54.
152. See id.
153. See Labour Regulations, art. 4.
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flicts great loss to the employer or seriously violates labor disci-
pline.15 4
The Labour Regulations limit work weeks to six days and
eight hours per day.155 Overtime is restricted, but an enterprise
may require overtime with the consent of the labor union. 156
The regulations set the rate of monthly wages at a minimum of
160 Won in the FETZ and 220 Won elsewhere. 157 Finally, the
Labour Regulations require that all employers provide safe and
hygienic work conditions, social security and social insurance,
safety and technical training, child care centers, and nutritious
meals for all their employees. 158
6. Land Use
Under the Constitution, the State owns all natural resources
of the country, including real property. 159 Foreign enterprises in
the DPRK are allowed to lease land from the land administration
office or the Zone Authority in the FETZ (the "lessor author-
ity").' 6 ° The leasing of land is conducted through consultation
with the appropriate lessor authority (in the FETZ, tender and
auction of land may also be conducted to lease the land) .161 The
leases have a maximum term of fifty years which may be ex-
tended through an application to the lessor authority.' 62 The
lessee of land may transfer the right to use the land or mortgage
the leased land subject to the approval of the relevant lessor au-
thority. 163
For mining, leasing laws are explicit in limiting the land
leases to the surface rights only. 164 The available collection of
laws and regulations do not provide any specific guidance for
foreign investors wishing to obtain mining rights.
154. See id. art. 15.
155. See id. art. 23.
156. See id. art. 24.
157. See id. art. 26.
158. See id. arts. 34-37.
159. See Constitution, supra note 24, art. 21.
160. See Law of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on the Leasing of
Land, art. 4 [hereinafter Land Leasing Law].
161. See id. art. 9.
162. See id. arts. 6, 36.
163. See id. arts. 18, 23.
164. See id. art. 3.
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7. Importation and Exportation of Goods
Concerning the importation and exportation of goods, the
DPRK has a stated policy of applying a zero or low tariff on
materials whose import and export are encouraged and high
tariff on materials that are discouraged. 165 Encouraged items,
such as raw materials brought in for production and domestic
sale, materials processed and exported by a foreign enterprises,
and materials for the purpose of assembly trade, entrepot trade
and re-export, are all exempt from customs duty. 6 6 Addition-
ally, other items may be exempt from tariffs under a treaty with a
foreign country, or a special decree from the State.'67 Although
tariff amounts are not specified in these statutes, discouraged
materials such as items produced and sold within the DPRK by
foreign enterprises, or items imported.for sale in the DPRK,'68
will most likely face high tariff barriers pursuant to the general
policy stated above.
8. Importation and Protection of Intellectual Property
Various regulations governing foreign enterprises place the
responsibility to screen the in-flow of technology on the Science
and Technology Inspection Body ("STIB") .169 The STIB is re-
sponsible for reviewing the mandatory applications for import
and export of technology. 7 ° Regulations specify that industrial
property rights, copyrights, and technical know-how may not be
contributed unless they meet one or more of the following re-
quirements: 1) production of new products or export items, 2)
improvement of quality and productivity of the products, 3) size-
able economy or raw materials, labor and energy, or utilization
to the full of natural resources, 4) relation to production
processes and safe and harmless to health, or 5) improvement of
economic arrangement and management."'7
Although it has been noted that the STIB is responsible for
165. See Customs Law, art. 4.
166. See id. art. 34.
167. See id.
168. See Customs Regulations for Free Economic and Trade Zone, art. 40 [herein-
after Customs Regulations].
169. See, e.g., Regulations on CJV, supra note 123, art. 72.
170. See id. art. 66.
171. See Regulations on EJV, supra note 74, art. 36; see also Regulations on CJV,
supra note 123, art. 40.
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supervising the flow of technology in the DPRK, the laws and
regulations do not explain the procedural practices of the STIB.
Matters such as the granting of patents, trademarks, and
copyrights and the protection of intangibles and trade secrets
are not addressed in the collection of laws and regulations pro-
vided to date, although such matters may be addressed in other
statutes.
9. Immigration
Immigration in and out of the FETZ is governed by the Reg-
ulations on Immigration Procedure in the FETZ ("Regulations
on Immigration"). No rules devoted to immigration into other
parts of the DPRK are available. In general, traffic into parts
other than the FETZ is closely controlled and monitored while
rules for travel directly in and out of the FETZ seem to be more
relaxed. Thus, if a foreigner is traveling anywhere outside of the
FETZ in the DPRK, he or she must carry an appropriate visa is-
sued by the diplomatic or consular missions of the DPRK in for-
eign countries.172 Traffic to and from the FETZ is confined to
routes designated by the State.' If a foreigner is traveling di-
rectly in and out of the FETZ from foreign countries, however,
various exceptions such as invitations from bodies in the zone,'74
tourist passes issued by the DPRK,' 75 diplomatic passes,7 6 and
frequent visitor passes 177 allow a foreigner to travel into the
DPRK without a visa. Additionally, no visa is required for those
wanting to leave the FETZ to another country.17 8
10. Taxes and Fees
As regards income taxes, foreign enterprises operating
outside the FETZ are taxed at twenty-five percent of taxable in-
comes.17 9 Enterprises operating within the FETZ are taxed at a
rate of fourteen percent of the taxable income and ventures op-
172. See Regulations on Immigration Procedure in the Free Economic and Trade
Zone, art. 7 [hereinafter Immigration Regulations].
173. See id. art. 5.
174. See id. art. 6.
175. See id. art. 10.
176. See id. art. 11.
177. See id. art. 9.
178. See id. art. 12.
179. See Foreign Investment-Business Enterprise and Individual Tax Law, supra
note 91, art. 12.
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erating in preferential sectors are taxed at a rate of ten percent
of taxable income.8 0 Foreign-invested enterprises are required
to file a tax return once every quarter in addition to an annual
tax return.
181
Under the Tax Law, earnings derived from business activi-
ties in the DPRK, as well as other incomes earned in the DPRK
(including interest, income from dividends, proceeds from the
lease or sale of fixed assets, proceeds from the transfer of assets,
royalties on industrial properties, and know-how and manage-
ment fees), are all included as part of income. 8 2 Income tax for
enterprises is calculated by subtracting from income the costs of
materials, fuel and power, labor, depreciation, goods purchased,
workshop and corporation management cost, premium for in-
surance and sales, and other expenses for the annual period of
January I to December 31 and, then, applying the prescribed tax
rate. 1
83
c. Extraction Fees and Royalties
Article 47 of the Tax Law states that foreign enterprises
must pay a registration and license tax to the local governments
for royalties on mining but does not elaborate further on the
nature or amounts of these taxes.
d. Property Taxes
Property taxes are assessed on all buildings, vessels, and air-
craft in the DPRK' 4 Buildings located in the FETZ are exempt
from the payment of property tax for the first five years.1 8 5 The
tax base for property is the same as the registered value of the
property18 6 and is paid on a quarterly basis.' 8 7
e. Sales Taxes
Foreign enterprises conducting the sale of goods or services
180. See id.
181. See id. art. 10.
182. See id. art. 8.
183. See id. art. 9.
184. See id. art. 25. The rate of property tax is as follows: 1% of registered value
for buildings and 1.4% of registered value for ships and aircraft. See id. at Table 3.
185. See id. art. 25.
186. See id. art. 27.
187. See id. art. 30.
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are subject to a monthly turnover tax. 188 The base for turnover
tax is measured by the total revenues from sales or services 189
and foreign enterprises are taxed according to the rate set for
the particular industry.190 Export goods, on the other hand, are
not subject to turnover tax.
f. Provincial and Local Taxes
Finally, in addition to the other taxes, foreign enterprises
are subject to local taxes. Local taxes include the city manage-
ment tax, registration and license tax, and vehicle tax.' The
monthly city management tax is one percent of the total wages
paid by the foreign enterprise. 192 Also, foreign individuals resid-
ing in the DPRK for more than six months must also pay one
percent of his or her revenue to the local government on a
monthly basis.' 9
3
E. Incentives and Guarantees
1. Freedom From Expropriation
Many questions concerning the concepts of ownership in
the DPRK still remain unresolved. One major concern is
whether ownership by corporate entities will be respected by the
State. The Constitution differentiates between state, private, and
collective ownership.'94 The Constitution further specifies that
all means of production in the DPRK are owned by the State. 95
These notions seem to conflict with the idea of foreign-invested
business ownership of the means of production. Although Arti-
cle 19 of the Law on Foreign Investment contains a guarantee
against nationalization or seizure of foreign investments and offi-
cials have reiterated that the property of foreign enterprises will
be respected, 196 there is nothing linking these guarantees to the
Constitution. And, presumably, in a conflict of laws or policy,
188. See id. art. 37.
189. See id. art. 38.
190. See id. at Table 5. Turnover tax in service sectors in the FETZ is reduced by
50%. See id. art. 42.
191. See id. art. 43.
192. See id. art. 46.
193. See Tax Regulations, supra note 91, art 67.
194. See Constitution, supra note 24, arts. 20-24.
195. See id. art. 20.
196. See Meetings, supra note 54.
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the Constitution would supersede all other legislation. Thus,
more clarification is needed in this area.
Article 19 of the Law on Foreign Investment reserves the
right of the State to seize or nationalize foreign investments in
"unavoidable circumstances" and assures that the State will pay
"fair compensation" to the foreign parties for their loss. Because
the laws do not define "unavoidable" or "unfair," it must be as-
sumed that the State retains the discretion to make these deter-
minations. This potentially broad power may be a source of con-
cern for foreigners investing not only capital and materials, but
also trade secrets and protected technology. Officials have indi-
cated, however, that the State would be willing to define more
closely these terms in individual contracts.197
2. Taxes and Fees
a. Priority Sector Enterprises
As noted above, certain preferred industries are given
greater tax incentives than others. Thus, enterprises in high
technology, natural-resource development, infrastructure devel-
opment, construction, research, and development are taxed at a
flat rate of ten percent of total income.1 98 In particular, the
DPRK seems to be interested in encouraging infrastructure de-
velopment by foreign investors, and has given a special tax ad-
vantage for investing in this sector. A foreign investment enter-
prise that invests more than sixty million Won in infrastructure
projects is exempted from tax for four years from the first profit
making year and, thereafter, the tax is reduced by up to fifty
percent for the following three years. 199
b. FETZ Enterprises
In its efforts to direct much of the foreign investment to the
FETZ, the DPRK has placed a variety of tax advantages for estab-
lishing an enterprise in the FETZ. As noted above, all businesses
located in the FETZ are taxed at a flat rate of fourteen percent
as opposed to the twenty-five percent rate that is imposed else-
where. 20 ' Additionally, for priority sector enterprises that re-
197. See id.
198. See Tax Law, supra note 91, art. 12.
199. See id. art. 15.
200. -See id. art. 12.
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main in the FETZ for more than ten years, taxes are waived for
three years from the first profit-making year and, thereafter, the
tax is reduced up to fifty percent for two more years.20 1 Service
sector enterprises that operate in the FETZ for at least ten years
will be exempt from tax for one year after the first profit-making
year and, thereafter, get a tax reduction by up to fifty percent for
the following two years. 2 2 Finally, the Law on FETZ exempts
customs duties on goods for the various needs of the enter-
prise.20
3
c. Reinvestment
Tax incentives encourage reinvestment in the DPRK. Enter-
prises that reinvest profits to increase registered capital in the
DPRK or to create another foreign enterprise that stays in the
DPRK for more than five years, can deduct one hundred percent
of that amount from their taxes if they are in infrastructure sec-
tor enterprises, or fifty percent in all other sectors.20 4
d. Tax Treaties
Article 12 of the Tax Regulations provides that agreements
between the DPRK and other countries on the issue of taxes will
take precedence over any conflicting tax laws or regulations. It
is not clear, however, whether the DPRK has a tax treaty with
another country, and it is uncertain what the policy of the State
is on negotiating tax treaties.
3. Reduced Land Rental
Normally, the user of leased land is expected to pay an an-
nual land-use charge fixed by the State.20 5 But, the regulations
provide another incentive by holding that the Lessor Authority
has discretion to grant a reduction of, or exemption from, the
land use charge for up to ten years for investments in the prior-
ity area or in the FETZ, depending upon the scale, contents, and
economic effectiveness of the investment. 20 6 Because the regula-
201. See id. art. 15.
202. See id.
203. See FETZ Law, art. 12.
204. See Tax Regulations, supra note 91, art. 35.
205. See Land Leasing Law, supra note 160, art. 33.
206. See Implementing Regulations for the Law of the D.P.R.K. on the Leasing of
Land, art. 95 [hereinafter Regulations on Land Leasing].
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tions do not provide any additional explanations for this benefit,
it is presumably another matter that a party may negotiate with
the appropriate authority.
G. Dissolution of Investment: Regulations, Taxes, and Fees
Through its regulatory schemes, the DPRK has established a
generally standardized procedure for dissolving different forms
of foreign investments. In the event that continuing to operate
an enterprise is no longer feasible, the regulations require that
the enterprise submit an application to the screening body for
approval of the dissolution.2 °7 If the application is approved, a
liquidation committee, consisting of a representative of the en-
terprise, a representative of the creditors, a certified public ac-
countant, and a representative of the screening body will go
about the business of liquidating the enterprise. 208 The liquida-
tion committee is responsible for informing all creditors and
debtors of the dissolution and settling all accounts of the enter-
prise. 9 Upon completing the liquidation, the committee sur-
renders the certificate of business registration, the business li-
cense, the certificate of tax registration to the relevant bodies,
and cancels the company's accounts.2 1 0 Finally, when all is done,
the registrar of business makes public the dissolution of the com-
pany.211 The regulations do not, however, indicate that there
are any taxes or fees to be paid upon the dissolution of the for-
eign investment.
IV. INVESTMENT IN NATURAL RESOURCES
Aside from the standard requirement that all foreign-in-
vested enterprises obtain approval from either the EEA or the
Zone Authority, there is no designation in the laws and regula-
tions of any specific authority to supervise the area of natural
resource extraction. A provision exists in the regulations for
both EJVs and CJVs, however, that may concern potential for-
207. See, e.g., Regulations on EJV, supra note 74, art. 136. The regulations concern-
ing CJVs and WFOEs provide parallel procedures for dissolution. See Regulations on
CJV, arts. 112-25; Regulations for WFOE, supra note 106, arts. 66-74. This outline will
use the EJV to as an illustration of the procedure for dissolution.
208. See Regulations on EJV, supra note 74, art. 140.
209. See id. arts. 142-48.
210. See id. art. 149.
211. See id. art. 151.
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eign investors in the mining industry. Article 7 of the Regula-
tions for the Law on CJVs and Article 12 of the Regulations for
the Law- on EJVs both contain provisions stating that ventures
which "export unprocessed natural resources of the DPRK" will
be prohibited. The extent of processing required in order to
circumvent this prohibition is unclear. Again, processing ore
into metal would presumably qualify, but processing into ore
concentrate may not. Presumably, mined ore and metals are
considered to be an "unprocessed natural resource." Hence, the
prohibition would prevent any foreign enterprise from export-
ing ore. This provision seems to conflict with other provisions
that specifically encourage "natural resource development"212
(mining is included in this category213 ).
Another area that is highly relevant to the mining industry
and is explicitly regulated is the area of environmental law. The
DPRK Law on the Protection of the Environment speaks very
generally to the goal of protecting and preserving the environ-
ment and is ineffective in providing clear guidance in this
area. 21 Under this law, the AC is designated as the body respon-
sible for fixing limits and standards on the allowable pollution
levels and providing a unified direction to environmental protec-
tion work.2 15 The law also requires a nonpermanent protection
committee to be established under the authority of the AC to
give collective guidance to environmental protection and take
any necessary measures promptly.2 6 But, because the environ-
mental law was written in 1986, it is uncertain whether this non-
permanent protection committee still exists today. One article
in these provisions explicitly mentions the mining industry and
specifically prohibits mining in scenic and historic areas.217
Considering the investment solicited for the Danchon re-
gion, DPRK law respecting natural resources contains some sig-
nificant gaps. Significantly, the concepts of concession and license
are missing from current DPRK law. As described to us by offi-
cials of the mining enterprises and of the Mining Ministry, mines
212. See, e.g., Foreign Investment Law, supra note 74, art. 7.
213. See Meetings, supra note 54.
214. See Law of the Democratic People's Rrepublic of Korea on the Protection of
the Environment.
215. See id. arts. 19, 39.
216. See id. art. 39.
217. See id. art. 14.
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operate on the basis of decisions taken by the Mining Ministry as
manifested in an allotment. Because the mining enterprise is it-
self a creature of the Mining Ministry, the question of terminat-
ing an allotment certificate never arises.
Foreign investors in the natural resources sector will almost
certainly insist on a higher level of protection for any significant
investment. This protection would certainly include the issu-
ance of a license under clearly defined procedures that specify
the rights that accompany the license, the holders ability to
transfer it, the specific obligations of the license holder, the con-
ditions under which the license can be revoked, and the ability
of the license holder to assign or pledge the license in connec-
tion with project finance. Although North Korean officials sug-
gested that concessions or licenses could be offered to foreign
investors through foreign investment contracts that precisely
regulate the rights of the investor, it is unclear whether this ap-
proach can really provide a satisfactory alternative to a license
system.
Another issue which is of equal concern to investors,
although less technically required in natural resource legislation,
is the question of how a concession or license is awarded. Social-
ist economies in transition have generally gone through several
stages on this issue, starting with so-called "contract negotia-
tions" in which an investor is invited to negotiate the terms of an
investment directly with state authorities that have discretion to
issue a license when they are satisfied that the interests of the
state are well served by the terms proposed. More recent legisla-
tion has moved clear of such approaches because of corruption
concerns, and some of the most recent legislation, like Kyrgyz-
stan's new Mining Law, requires a competitive tender in each
case before a license is issued. In the case of the Danchon prov-
ince natural resource assets, it remains to be seen exactly how
the North Korean authorities will approach the process of award-
ing rights among multiple contenders.
Finally, directly relevant to financing large-scale foreign in-
vestment is the existence of some law governing the pledging of
assets. North Korean foreign investment legislation does not yet
envision the possibility of encumbering assets located on Korean
soil, whether movable or immovable. Legislation that is now at
the drafting stage would evidently contemplate and regulate the
terms of commercial lending in the Golden Triangle area. This
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legislation was described to the authors, although not furnished
to them. North Korean foreign economic policy experts appear
to appreciate the need for a pledge device and to be familiar
with the Chinese legislation from 1995, among other models. In
the absence of both a pledge law and a central recording system
for pledges, however, the task of securing capital finance for ven-
tures in North Korea is likely to be a difficult one.
V. ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES
In our discussions in Pyongyang with North Korean policy
experts we noted any areas where North Korean law did not ap-
pear to anticipate or address some important concerns of for-
eign investors. In such cases, it was repeatedly pointed out to us
that the government of North Korea may permit investments on
terms different from those specified by the foreign investment
legislation if good cause exists. Such an investment may take the
form of a comprehensive foreign investment contract concluded
with the participation of the North Korean government. In par-
ticular, tax holidays, tax rates, and tax issues such as accelerated
depreciation, net operating loss carryforwards, and deductibility
of expenses; questions of currency convertibility and use; the
treatment of expatriate employees; environmental liability; the
granting of concessions or licenses in natural resources; the
terms for capital finance; export and import restrictions; and
royalties and other fees were all noted as matters that might be
suitable for a foreign investment contract. North Korean au-
thorities stressed, however, that such vehicles would likely only
be available for large, strategically significant investments by
highly desirable investors.
An investor considering this alternative approach would be
well advised to consider the precedent provided by the Korean
Peninsula Energy Development Organization ("KEDO") con-
tracts with the North Korean government. These agreements,
that have been examined by the authors, grant extraordinary
protections and privileges to KEDO and individual KEDO em-
ployees which are considerably more liberal than anything con-
templated by the foreign investment legislation. Our discussions
with KEDO representatives suggests that the North Koreans have
upheld the bargain that they struck with KEDO.
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EXHIBIT A
LIST OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT LAWS AND
REGULATIONS OF THE DEMOCRATIC
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC
OF KOREA 218
Vol. 1
Law of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on Free
Economic and Trade Zone
Law of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on For-
eign Investment
Law of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea Law on
Foreign Enterprises
Law of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on Con-
tractual Joint Venture
Law of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on For-
eign Investment-Business Enterprise and Foreign Individual Tax
Law of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on For-
eign Exchange Control
Law of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on the
Leasing of Land
Vol. 2
Law of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on For-
eign-Invested Bank
Customs Law of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea
Law of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on Eq-
uity Joint Venture
Regulations on Immigration Procedure in the Free Eco-
nomic and Trade Zone
Labour Regulations for Foreign-Invested Business
Regulations on Resident Representative Offices of Foreign
Business in the Free Economic and Trade Zone
Enforcement Regulations for Foreign-Invested Business and
Foreign Individual Tax Law
218. Translated by the Committee for the Promotion of External Economic
Cooperation of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.
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Vol. 3
Civil Proceedings Act of the Democratic People's Republic
of Korea
Regulations for the Implementation of the D.P.R.K. on
Wholly Foreign-owned Enterprises
Regulations on Free Trade Ports
Regulations on Foreigner's Stay and Residence in the Free
Economic and Trade Zone
Regulations for the Implementation of the Law of the
D.P.R.K. on Foreign Exchange Control
Implementing Regulations for the Law of the D.P.R.K. on
the Leasing of Land
Vol. 4
Law of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on the
Protection of the Environment
Law of the DPRK on the External Economic Contract
Insurance Law of DPRK
Implementing Regulations for the Law on Foreign-Invested
Bank
Vol. 5
Law of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea Law on
External Civil Relations
Notary Public Law of the Democratic People's Republic of
Korea
Implementing Regulations for the Law on EquityJoint Ven-
ture
Regulations on Forwarding Agency in the Free Economic
and Trade Zone
Customs Regulations for Free Economic and Trade Zone
Regulations on Transfer and Mortgage of Buildings in the
Free Economic and Trade Zone Annex
Vol. 6
Implementing Regulations for the Law on Contractual Joint
Venture
Bookkeeping Regulations for Foreign-Invested Enterprises
REGULATIONS OF KOREA
Regulations on Naming of Foreign-Invested Enterprises
Regulations on the Registration of Foreign-Invested Enter-
prises
Regulations on Processing Trade in the Free Economic and
Trade Zone
Regulations on Engraving and Registration of Logos (Com-
mon Seals) for Foreign-Invested Enterprises in the Free Eco-
nomic and Trade Zone
Regulations on the Development and Management of In-
dustrial Estates in the Free Economic and Trade Zone
Regulations on Advertisement in the Free Economic and
Trade Zone
Vol. 7
Regulations on Entrepot Trade in the Free Economic and
Trade Zone
Regulations on Contract Construction in the Free Eco-
nomic and Trade Zone
Regulations on Tourism in the Free Economic and Trade
Zone
Regulations on Agent for Foreign Investor in the Free Eco-
nomic and Trade Zone
Bookkeeping Regulations for Foreign-Invested Bank
Regulations on Certified Public Accounting for Foreign In-
vested Enterprise
Regulations on Currency Circulation in the Free Economic
and Trade Zone
Regulations on Border Quarantine For the Free Economic
and Trade Zone
Regulations on Traffic Inspection at the Boundary of the
Free Economic and Trade Zone
Regulations on Registration of Vehicles in the Free Eco-
nomic and Trade Zone
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Exhibit B
Contractual Joint
No. Item Venture Equity Joint Venture Foreign Enterprise
1 Number of Investors No Restriction by No Restriction by No Restriction by
Law Law Law
2 Operating Authority Host Partner Joint Foreign Partner
3 Distribution and Profit According to the According to the No
Contract Share of Investment
4 Geographical Restriction No No Rajin-Sonbong Zone
5 Sectoral Restriction No No Publishing, news,
Broadcasting &
Communication
6 Approving Authority Committee of Committee of - Committee of
Foreign Economy Foreign Economy Foreign Economy
and Zone
Authority
- Examination and
Approval
7 Approval Process * Agreement of Same as Contractual * Presentation of
Draft Contract Joint Venture Application to
- Application for Zone Authority
Establishment * Examination and
- Examination and Approval
Approval
8 Transferability of e Agreement of Both Same as Contractual e Contract of
Investment Sides Joint Venture Transferability
- Contract of * Approval of
Transferability Committee of
- Approval of Foreign Economy*
Committee of
Foreign Economy*
9 Limited Life No Restriction by No Restriction by No Restriction by
Law Law Law
10 Contracted Decision of Joint Decision of Board of Decision of
Management Committee Directors Foreigner
11 Conditions of * Employing * Employing Employing contract
Employment Contract of Contract of Local of Local and Foreign
Foreign and Foreign Staff Staff
Technician and Technicians
- Approval of * Approval of
Authority Authority
12 Example Dokwolsan Samhung-Coast No
Contractual Joint Equity Joint Venture
Venture (sp2m) (Rubber products
(Foreign side: Hong e.g. sponge from
Kong Jomsyong Co.) mattresses)
• Several signed, but not yet implemented.
